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Economic Activity and Institutions 
 
1. Introduction 
The ascendance of ￿institutional theory￿ is a continuation and extension of open 
systems conceptions into the study of organizations (Scott 2001). In addition to the 
technical environment, i.e., resources and task-related information, open systems 
theory places organizational activity into a wider social and cultural context, i.e., the 
institutional environment, which ￿constrains, shapes, penetrates, and renews the 
organization￿ (page xx). Institutional thought has captured the imagination of 
economists, political scientists, and sociologists since the late 19
th century. In 
economics, attempts to adopt the scientific method for the discipline were challenged 
by a group of economists led by Gustav Schmoller (1900-4). Drawing on the ideas of 
Kant and Hegel, these historical critics asserted that simplistic assumptions about the 
￿rational man￿ were unfounded, and the quest for a set of universal laws for 
economics were fruitless, since economic processes operate ￿within a social 
framework, ￿shaped by a set of cultural and historical forces￿ (Scott 2001:2). 
Institutionalists have also been reluctant to embrace the notion of economic 
equilibrium. 
The American institutionalists were influenced by the German historical school and 
the ￿philosophy of pragmatism￿, manifested in ￿a suspicion of abstract universal 
principles, an interest in solving practical problems, and an awareness of the role of 
events and historical contingencies￿ (Scott 2001:4). Early institutionalists pointed to 
pervasive market power and to indeterminacy even under perfect competition; the role 
of social institutions in shaping individual preferences (and hence the importance of 
institutions as the subject of economic analysis); the usefulness of pragmatic and 
psychologically realistic models of economic motivation (as opposed to 
utilitarianism); and the centrality of time and space in understanding the evolution of 
the economic system (Scott 2001). 
The ￿old￿ and ￿new￿ strands of institutionalism in economics emphasize the 
importance of institutions and promote the need for ￿a genuinely evolutionary 
economics￿ (Hodgson 1994a:59). Institutionalists define socio-economic institutions 
as shared and reinforced habits within a society or a group (Hodgson 1994a:64). 
Adopting this broad interpretation of the institution, the question for the proponents of 
institutionalism in economics is ￿not how things stabilize themselves in a ￿static 
state￿, but how they endlessly grow and change￿ (Hodgson 1988:130). Key to 
understanding the processes of growth and change must thus be the institutions within 
the economy, not individual preferences as assumed in neo-classical economics. But 
understanding institutions themselves requires appreciation of complexity, continuity, 
and evolution in historical time. It was perhaps in this spirit that Veblen (1899) 
asserted 
the situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective, 
coercive process, by acting upon [humans￿] habitual view of things, and so 
altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental attitude handed down from 
the past. ￿At the same time, [humans￿] present habits of thought tend to Economic Activity and Institutions 
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persist indefinitely, except as circumstances enforce a change. These 
institutions [constitute] the factor of social inertia, psychological inertia, 
conservatism.  (Veblen 1899:190-1, cited in Hodgson 1988). 
Institutionalism was the dominant school of economic thought in the interwar years, 
particularly in the U.S. In the years after the First World War there was widespread 
recognition of the need for ￿improved economic data and policy analysis￿. There was 
also recognition of the potential role of government in the reconstruction of the 
economy (Rutherford 2001:178). Institutionalists did much to improve the statistical 
work of government agencies and develop monetary and financial data, including 
work on money flows which later became the ￿flow-of-funds￿ accounts (Rutherford 
2001:179).  
This paper is one of two papers
1 concerning the waste management sector transition
2 
project. This paper examines some of the numerous meanings and interpretations 
associated with the words ￿institution￿ and ￿institutions￿ and the different levels at 
which the two notions are employed. Institutionalism, institutionalization, institutional 
change and related terms are discussed followed by an examination of the links 
between ￿institutionalism￿ and the discipline of economics. The analytical, policy and 
political implications of the institutionalist approach are discussed and ways in which 
the institutionalist approach may be applied to changes in the economy during 
transitions are explored.  
2. The Meaning(s) of “Institution” 
Institutions ￿are not merely constraints, bearing upon a pre-existing and ￿non-
institutional￿ economy or market. Economies and markets are themselves constituted 
as collections of institutions and [as such] are not merely constrained by them￿ 
(Hodgson 1999b:145). In relative terms the institution is more ￿permanent￿ or 
￿invariable￿ as a unit of analysis (Hodgson 1988, 1999b) than neoclassical 
economics￿ ￿individual￿. ￿The institution￿ is therefore more akin to spatial and 
temporal inquiry than ￿the individual￿ with a fixed set of preferences (Williamson 
1994).
3 The focus by the new institutionalist economists on ￿the institution￿ 
represents ￿a major departure from the standard rational choice theory of neoclassical 
economics in that the actor￿s operative goals and values, and indeed the actor￿s view 
of the choice context, is seen as culturally determined to a considerable degree, at 
least regarding actions that involve coordination with or will induce responses from 
others￿ (Nelson 1994:130) 
                                                           
1 The second paper concerns the operationalization of the institutionalist framework. 
2 ￿Transitions￿ are innovation-based structural changes in the political economy accompanied by an 
evolution of political and social institutions (Kemp 2002, Rotmans et al. 2002). 
3 The importance of the role played by institutions in determining the direction of economic 
development has also been emphasized in the policy realm. Agenda 21, for example, makes numerous 
references to the important role of formal local and supra-local institutions in facilitating sustainable 
development, particularly in Parts 3, 11, 15, and 37.  Economic Activity and Institutions 
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Institutions have been defined as ￿the set of conventions and rules of action prevailing 
in the economy, which are embedded in the local social structure and show a marked 
regional differentiation￿ (Kr￿tke 1999:683). ￿Institutions are ￿proceduralist￿ rather 
than ￿consequentialist,￿ influencing the type of behaviour that occurs in a particular 
situation independently of an individual￿s goal orientation￿ (Elster 1989, cited in 
Setterfield 1993:756). Institutions are ￿settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of men￿ (Veblen 1919:239, cited in Hodgson 1988:10). The evidence for 
an institution is ￿the regularities of people￿s actions and their responses to questions 
about what they are doing￿ (Neale 1994:404). Commons (1924) defined an institution 
as collective action exercised by different types of organization ￿ such as the family, 
the corporation, the trade union, and the state ￿ in control of individual action. 
Mitchell (1950:373) described an institution as ￿a convenient term for the more 
important among the widely prevalent, highly standardized social habits￿. Young 
(1994, 2002) underlines a physical difference between institutions and organizations. 
Institutions are ￿sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct defining social 
practices￿ (Young 1994:3-4) whereas organizations are material entities possessing 
offices, personnel, budgets, equipment, and, more often than not, legal personality 
(Young 1994, 2002). In a wider interpretation, Coriat and Dosi (1998:6) view 
institutions as being represented by formal organizations, patterns of behaviour, and 
negative norms and constraints. 
According to Neale (1987:1184) an institution is ￿a mental construct￿ while 
institutions are ￿both the internalized injunctions that people follow and the actions 
that others will take to enforce the injunctions or to protect people in the liberties and 
opportunities that institutions provide￿ (Neale 1994:404). To North (1991:97) 
institutions are ￿the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, 
and social interactions [consisting of] informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)￿. Elsewhere, North (1990:3) has stated that institutions are ￿the rules 
of the game in a society ￿ [that] ￿ structure incentives in human exchange, ￿ [and] 
￿ affect the performance of economies over time￿, while to Bush (1986:39) an 
institution is ￿a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour￿. In 
sociology and political theory, institutions are usually treated as various rule systems 
which occur in sets, e.g. constitutional rule systems for society, collective choice rules 
governing different kinds of organizations, and operational rules of organizations. 
Rules may be formal or informal, actively used, or remain buried in statute books or 
long forgotten customs. Institutions affect the behaviour of organizations by defining 
￿appropriate￿ social practices and codes of conduct.  
It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that there is a wide range of definitions and 
descriptions for ￿institution￿ and ￿institutions￿. The definitions and descriptions may 
be grouped into three broad categories, each comprising of a set of ￿levels￿.
4 First 
there are form-based definitions primarily concerned with the form, the physical 
structure, and/or appearance, of an institution. Second, there are behaviour-based 
definitions whose focus is firmly on action or activity. The form- and behaviour-based 
                                                           
4 Drawn from Jessop (1997), these levels are: interpersonal relations (social embeddedness), inter-
organizational relations (institutional embeddedness), and relations among functionally differentiated 
institutional orders (societal embeddedness).  Economic Activity and Institutions 
SAEED PARTO 
  4
definitions also concern themselves with the ￿transactional￿ implications of 
institutions. Third, there are context-based descriptions of institutions concerned 
mainly with the presence/absence of, or interactions among, institutions. Focus in this 
third group is explicitly on the evolutionary aspects of the institutional context. Each 
of these categories is discussed in further detail below. 
2.1 “Form-based” Definitions 
Cooley (1956:314) cites language, government, the church, laws, and customs of 
property and of the family as institutions. Neale￿s (1987, 1994) expanded list includes 
economic markets, marriage systems, churches and temples with their religious codes 
and informal rules and beliefs, law courts with their formal and informal procedural 
rules as well as their legal codes, the American middle class family, and courtesies of 
the dinner table. ￿Love and reproduction￿ and ￿￿economic￿ profit or Ricardian rent￿ 
are positively not institutions according to Neale (1987). To Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992:2) institutions are ￿both formal structures and informal rules and procedures 
that structure conduct￿ (cited in Scott 2001:33). North (1990) seems to emphasize the 
￿intangibility￿ of institutions: rules and regulations are given as examples of formal 
institutions while conventions and codes of behaviour are informal institutions. 
Political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory agency), 
economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies 
(churches, clubs athletic associations), and educational bodies (schools, universities, 
vocational training centres) are all ￿organizations￿ (North 1990:5).  
Institutions can be created and they can evolve. They change incrementally rather 
than in discontinuous fashion (North 1990). Institutions ￿appear to be independent 
and external to behaviour, they are developed and preserved through interactions 
among individuals and exist ￿as a habit of mind and of action, largely unconscious 
because largely common to all the groups￿ The individual is always cause as well as 
effect of the institutions￿￿ (Cooley 1956:313-14, cited in Scott 2001:10). The 
causality in Cooley￿s (1956) description is circular and flows from exogenous 
(societal) to endogenous (to individuals and organizations) and back again to 
exogenous. In the intermediate stage of this circular causation process, institutions as 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, once 
￿instituted￿ in individuals and organizations, become ￿much more impervious to 
deliberate policies￿ (North 1990:6) focused on societal change. Institutionalized 
behaviour, though often a ￿given￿ in the realm of politics and policy-making, is of 
crucial importance in understanding socio-economic and political change. The process 
of institutionalization can help to explain how the past, present, and future connect to 
determine the path of historical change.  
In policy terms, some have argued that formal structures such as governments can and 
do successfully employ coercive and/or regulative power in introducing innovations 
and reforms into the workings of the market (Jepperson and Meyer 1991). This is 
particularly the case with corporatist governments as compared to pluralist or 
individualist systems of government. Stepan (1978:xii) takes this argument one step 
further: ￿the state must be considered as more than the ￿government￿. It is the 
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not Economic Activity and Institutions 
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only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity 
but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well￿ (cited in 
Hodgson 1988:153). In the short run, these coercive systems appear as ￿exogenous 
constraints￿, but in the long run, they are endogenous to the workings of the 
economy￿, [giving rise to] an institutional environment that frames current economic 
activity￿ by individuals, groups, or organizations (Setterfield 1993:761). 
￿Constraints￿ may be manifested as inertia or goal-oriented steering of the economy 
by governments. This is demonstrated in a study by Cole (1989) who establishes a 
direct relationship between (exogenous) government intervention and changes in the 
economy through legitimating, informing, and supporting adoption and retention of 
innovations.
5  
2.2 “Behaviour-based” Definitions 
Institutions are ￿the constraints that human beings impose on themselves￿￿ (North 
1990:5). Institutions may be viewed as shaping behaviour at the individual, 
organizational, or societal levels: ￿Institutions provide guidance and resources for 
acting as well as prohibitions and constraints on action. ￿ Institutions operate at 
multi levels, from world system to interpersonal interaction￿ (Scott 2001:50). 
Similarly, ￿institutions are prescribed or proscribed patterns of correlated behaviour 
and attitudes that coordinate life in community. They specify ￿ as codes, rules, laws, 
customs ￿ what can and cannot be done￿ (Tool 1993:122). At the individual level, 
institutions ￿imply ￿you may￿ as well as ￿thou shalt not,￿ thus creating as well as 
limiting choices￿ (Neale 1987:1179). Institutions are a system of norms that ￿regulate 
the relations of individuals to each other ￿[and define] what the relations of 
individuals ought to be￿(Parsons 1990:327, cited in Scott 2001:15). These systems of 
norms may be societal or confined to organizations, e.g., firms. 
At the organization level, institutions ￿construct actors and define their available 
modes of action; they constrain behaviour, but they also empower it￿.￿ (Scott 
2001:34). At this level, institutions are ￿collective action in restraint, liberation, and 
expansion of individual action￿ in the context of ￿going concerns￿, e.g., a firm and its 
workers, a labour union, a nation state. ￿The working rules of going concerns 
represent the manifestation of collective action in restraint and liberation of individual 
action￿ (Bromley 1994:388). An institution is ￿a regularity of behaviour or a rule that 
is generally accepted by members of a social group, that specifies behaviour in 
specific situations, and that is either self-policed or policed by external authority￿ 
(Rutherford 1994:182). According to North (1990:4), institutions are perfectly 
analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport. There are written rules 
and unwritten codes of conduct that supplement formal rules and violators are 
punished through sanction. 
                                                           
5 Cole￿s (1989) study of firms in Japan, Sweden, and United States (cited in Scott 2001:116) finds the 
higher the level of intervention by governments, the more important is the role played by government 
agencies, trade associations, and union organizations in legitimating, informing, and supporting 
adoption and retention of innovations: ￿Japan more than Sweden, and Sweden more than the United 
States, possessed such supportive structures, with the result that the innovation spread more widely and 
were more stable in the former than the latter societies￿. Economic Activity and Institutions 
SAEED PARTO 
  6
At the societal level, ￿institutions are patterns of correlated behaviour￿ (Bush 
1987:1076), represented by regular, planned behaviour of people for the ideas and 
values associated with these regularities (Neale 1994). Institutions may become 
manifested as ￿habituation; collective action in control of individual action; widely 
prevalent, highly standardized social habits; a way of thought or action embedded in 
the habits of a group or the customs of a people; [and,] prescribed patterns of 
correlated behaviour￿ (Neale 1994:402). In political terms, an institution is ￿a 
structure in which powerful people are committed to some value or interest￿. The 
same institutions are continuously regenerated by succeeding generations of power-
holders through ￿selection, socialization, controlling conditions of incumbency, and 
hero worship￿￿ (Stinchcombe 1968:107-111, cited in Scott 2001:25). It is also 
possible for powerful actors to ￿impose their will on others, based on the use or threat 
of sanctions, ￿provide inducements to secure compliance, ￿[or use] ￿ authority, in 
which coercive power is legitimated  by a normative framework that both supports 
and constrains the exercise of power￿ (Scott 2001:53). 
According to Hamilton (1932:84, cited in Neale 1987:1178), institutions ￿connote a 
way of thought or action of some prevalence or permanence, which is embedded in 
the habits of a group or the customs of a people￿. The emphasis on permanence is 
echoed by Hughes (1939), Hodgson (1988), Jepperson (1991), and Setterfield (1993). 
Hughes held that an institution is ￿an establishment of relative permanence of a 
distinctly social sort￿ (Hughes 1939:297, cited in Scott 2001:10). Hodgson (1988:10) 
refers to a ￿social institution￿ as ￿a social organization which, through the operation 
of tradition, custom or legal constraint, tends to create durable and routinized patterns 
of behaviour￿. Similarly, Jepperson (1991) sees institutions as multi-faceted, durable 
social structures with symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources.  
Hamilton (1932:84) also asserted that institutions ￿fix the confines of and impose 
form upon the activities of human beings￿ and spoke of the world as ￿a tangled and 
unbroken web of institutions￿. For Hughes (1939) this web represented ￿consistency￿, 
through establishing ￿a set of mores or formal rules￿, and ￿concert or organization￿, 
through enabling people to act collectively. The web-like interconnectedness, 
continuity, and consistency implied by Hughes (1939) are also alluded to by Neale 
(1987), who sees institutions as giving ￿meaning and continuity to actions and 
[assuring] that each action fits with some of the actions of other people to maintain 
ongoing processes￿ (Neale 1987:1180). The set of mores and formal rules referred to 
by Hughes (1939) as institutions also resonates with Parsons￿ (1940) description of 
institutions as ￿normative patterns which define what are felt to be, in the given 
society, proper, legitimate, or expected modes of action or of social relationship￿ 
(Parsons 1940:190, cited in Hodgson 1988:123-4). Similarly, institutions are 
￿enduring features of social life￿ (Giddens 1984:24) and tend to maintained and 
reproduced across generations (Zucker 1977, cited in Scott 2001:49). One can think of 
the Church, the State, and the Market as demonstrative examples of ￿institution￿.  
In a capitalist economy, ￿economic institutions constitute ￿any correlated behaviour of 
agents￿ that reoccurs under the same or similar conditions￿ (Dopfer 1991:536)￿ 
(Setterfield 1993:756). Political systems ￿are not neutral arenas within which external 
interests compete but rather complex forms that generate independent interests and Economic Activity and Institutions 
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advantages and whose rules and procedures exert important effects on whatever 
business is being transacted￿ (Scott 2001:34). One such effect is the imposition of 
￿transaction cost￿ on economic exchanges, said to be the cumulative product of legal 
fees, insurance, gathering of information by the exchanging parties, and so forth 
(North 1990). Transaction cost arises from ensuring that institutions, i.e., the formal 
rules and the informal codes of conduct, are not violated. Transaction costs are 
directly related to ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment (North 
1990:4). Institutions also play a key role in determining the costs of production and 
hence affect the performance of an economy (North 1990:28,61,69). 
2.3 “Context-based” Descriptions 
According to Veblen (1899), institutions serve one of two divergent categories of 
purpose in economic life. In the following the first category is contrasted with the 
second: acquisition or production, pecuniary activity or industrial activity, invidious 
(ceremonial) or non-invidious (technological) economic interest, salesmanship or 
workmanship, vested interest or ￿the common man￿, sabotage or community 
serviceability, and conscientious withdrawal of efficiency or inordinately productive 
enterprise (Tool 1986:36-37, 1993). Institutions are ￿a product of human interaction￿ 
(Scott 2001:13). They are ￿social facts: phenomena perceived by the individual to be 
both external (to the person) and coercive (backed by sanctions)￿. For Durkheim 
([1901] 1950), these systems of knowledge, belief, and moral authority are social 
institutions (Scott 2001:13). Social institutions are thus intertwined with culture in 
that they are ￿the structure and meaning of human life￿ (Neale 1994:404). A culture is 
￿a collective legacy of patterns of action￿. Like institutions, ￿culture defines the 
permissible and the forbidden, defines right and wrong, the admirable and its 
opposite, gives context to these definitions with rules for behaviour, and so provides 
opportunities as well as limits￿ (Neale 1987:1179). There are clear linkages between 
Neale￿s description of institutions and Veblen￿s (1899) ￿technological ￿ ceremonial￿ 
dichotomy (table 1), as summarized by Tool (1977:827). 
Table. 1 Veblen’s Dichotomy 





Free Income  Tangible Performance 
Vested Interests  Common Man 
Sabotage Community  Serviceability 
Pecuniary Employment  Industrial Employment 
Invidious Emulation  Technological Efficiency 
Conscientious Withdrawal of Efficiency  Valuable Information and Guidance 
Competitive Advertising  Inordinately Productive Enterprise 
Business Prosperity  Industrial Efficiency 
Source: Hayden (1982b) 
Social ceremonies are ￿the habitual patterns of behaviour based on emotions and 
social mores; they are therefore past-bound￿ while technology is ￿the dynamic force 
which is constantly recombining and providing for new opportunities, thereby 




6 Social ceremonies arguably constitute the ￿culture￿ closely associated 
with capitalism while technology could be interpreted as representing change toward 
￿communitarian￿ social mores based on the belief that ￿people￿s lives are organized 
and their welfare determined by a community￿s organic social process￿ (Hayden 
1993:304). Hayden￿s (1982b) interpretation of the ceremonial-technological 
dichotomy is also analogous to Tool￿s (1993) interpretation of Veblen￿s notions of 
￿invidious￿ and ￿non-invidious￿ discrimination in pursuit of change and economic 
interest. To Veblen invidious meant: ￿judgements of worth or merit rooted in race, 
creed, gender, ancestry, ethnicity, wealth, ownership, power, tradition, and the like 
￿[which] generate class, status, rank, income, discretion, and participatory 
distinctions within communities￿. Those against whom invidious discrimination is 
directed ￿are denied options, entitlements, and the full development of their 
capabilities￿ (Tool 1993:122). 
In addition to the form-, behaviour-, and context-based categories described above it 
is also possible to use the wide range of definitions and descriptions for institutions to 
draw out distinct types of institution. The next section provides a typology of 
institutions. 
3. A Typology of Institutions 
Focusing on the context of economic activity, Scott (2001:51-8) identifies three 
￿pillars￿ of institutions. These are the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
pillars. The regulative aspects of institutions are manifest in rule-setting, monitoring, 
and sanctioning activities: ￿￿regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish 
rules, inspect others￿ conformity to them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions ￿ 
rewards and punishments ￿ in an attempt to influence future behaviour￿ (page 52). 
The state in this case is ￿rule maker, referee, and enforcer￿ and there is a potential for 
the state to forgo neutrality by developing its own interests and operate somewhat 
autonomously from other societal actors (page 54). The Normative aspects of 
institutions impose constraints on social behaviour as well as empower and enable 
social action. Normative aspects are most pronounced in ￿kinship groups, social 
classes, religious belief systems, and voluntary associations where common beliefs 
and values are more likely to exist￿ (page 55). The Cultural-Cognitive aspects of 
institutions are ￿the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and 
the frames through which meaning is made￿. The hyphen in cultural-cognitive 
￿recognizes that internal interpretive processes are shaped by external cultural 
frameworks￿ (page 57). A cultural-cognitive conception of institutions ￿stresses the 
central role played by the socially mediated construction of a common framework of 
meaning￿ (page 58). 
                                                           
6 Elsewhere, Hayden emphasizes the importance of definitional clarity if ￿technology￿ is to be used in 
the same manner as Veblen: ￿Technology, which is one of the most important ingredients of human 
welfare, has become a foul word in the minds of many people because it is so regularly associated with 
hazardous spills, unemployment, cancer, community disruption, consumer victimization, ozone 
depletion, and so forth. If technology is to advance in the sense of enhancing progress for human and 
ecosystem welfare, the people￿s legislative bodies must explicitly and directly take back control of the 
research functions of their public universities￿ (Hayden 1993:293). Economic Activity and Institutions 
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Table 2 expands on Scott￿s (2001) ￿pillars￿ of institutions to introduce five ￿types￿ of 
institution. This table provides descriptions and examples these institutions types and 
denotes the main direction(s) of regulation.
7 
Table 2. Types of Institution 
Institutions Type  Examples  Direction of Régulation 
Associative: Institutions as mechanisms 
facilitating privileged interaction 
Business Networks; Kinship 
Groups; Social Classes; 
Associations; Interest Groups 
Member ↔ Member 
Behavioural: Institutions as 
standardized (recognizable) social habits 
Habits; Routines; Ways of 
Doing Things; Shared Beliefs; 
Theories in Use 
Individual → Society 
Cognitive: Institutions as mental models 
and constructs or definitions 
Cultural and Social Values; 
Superstitions; ￿Wisdom￿  Individual ← Society 
Constitutive: Institutions setting the 
bounds of social relations  
Language; Property Rights 
Structures; Agreements; 
Arrangements; Collective 
Actions initiated by the State 
Agencies, Firms, Unions, 
Citizens Groups or Family 
Individuals ↔ Individuals 
and  
Groups ↔ Groups 
Regulative: Institutions as prescriptions 
and proscriptions  
Written and Unwritten ￿Rules 
of the Game￿; State as Rule 
Maker, Referee, and Enforcer  
Society and State 
↓ 
Individuals and Groups 
  
From an economics perspective, ￿transaction￿ between two or more wills consists of 
￿giving, taking, persuading, coercing, defrauding, commanding, obeying, competing, 
governing, in a world of scarcity, mechanism and rules of conduct [social 
institutions]￿ (Commons 1950:7, cited in Scott 2001:3). Transactions among 
economic agents are shaped by ￿institutions￿, best viewed as multifaceted, durable 
social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources (Scott 2001). Institutions are relatively resistant to change (Hamilton 1932, 
Hodgson 1988, Jepperson 1991). They span generations, are maintained, and are 
reproduced (Zucker 1977, Harvey 1996). Put differently, institutions are ￿the more 
enduring features of social life￿ giving solidity [to social systems] across time and 
space￿ (Giddens 1984:24, cited in Scott 2001:49). Institutions are manifestations of 
interactions among humans based on rules, norms, and values. As such, institutions 
are produced, modified, and/or reproduced by human behaviour (Scott 2001). The 
￿permanency￿ or durability of institutions is only relative as institutions continuously 
undergo change due to societal dynamics and entropy, or a tendency toward disorder 
or disorganization (Zucker 1988b:26). 
Scott￿s (2001:48) overview of the role of institutions provides the descriptions for 
four of the five institution types identified in table 2. First, institutions are 
￿constitutive￿ in that they are social structures that have attained a high degree of 
                                                           
7 Positive and negative feedback loops transmitted through inter-relations exist between all elements in 
the third column of this table. From an evolutionary, dialectical perspective the feedback loops are best 
described by the ￿Cause-Effect-Cause￿ notion. The interactions depicted in the third column are 
assumed to be initiated by the element(s) on the left side of each arrow. The direction of each arrow 
indicates the sequence in the Cause-Effect-Cause continuum. Economic Activity and Institutions 
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resilience and operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.
8 Second, they are ￿cognitive￿ 
in that they are based on values and embedded in culture.
9 Third, they are ￿regulative￿ 
in that they provide stability and give meaning to social life.
10 Fourth, they are 
￿behavioural￿ in that they are transmitted by various carriers, including symbolic and 
relational systems, routines, and artefacts.
11 In addition, there is a degree of selectivity 
associated with the societal role of institutions. The fifth institution type is 
￿associative￿, referring to socio-political structures characterized by exclusion, 
socialization, controlling conditions of incumbency, and hero worship to express 
certain values or interests. Associative institutions are reproduced by succeeding 
generations of power holders.
12  
There are in addition numerous ￿hybrid￿ descriptions of institutions consisting of two 
or more of the types identified in table 2. For example, Setterfield (1993:761) defines 
institutions as ￿exogenous constraints￿ (regulative) which in time become endogenous 
to the working of the economy and the actions of individuals (behavioural). Scott 
(2001:52) also refers to institutions as ￿regulatory processes￿ to establish rules, 
inspect others￿ conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions. The 
internalization of various institutions by individuals and groups of individuals can be 
cause for inertia or resistance to change. Hughes (1939) views institutions as 
behavioural and regulative in that they determine individual or group action according 
to a set of mores and/or formal rules. Similar views are expressed by Neale (1987) 
and Hayden (1993). According to Rutherford (1994:182) institutions are at once 
regulative and constitutive in that they denote regularity in behaviour by individuals at 
large and by individuals within an organization. An organization is in turn subjected 
to external (social) regularities which are constituted at higher scales. 
Neale (1987, 1994) identifies three characteristics of institutions as patterns of 
activities (behavioural), rules giving activities repetition, stability, and order by 
establishing the boundaries of action (regulative), and folkviews explaining or 
justifying the activities and the rules (cognitive). Bush refers to institutions as patterns 
of correlated behaviour (1987:1076) while Hodgson (1988:10) and Tool (1993:122) 
seem to emphasize the constitutive / regulative / behavioural role of institutions as 
social organizations that create durable and routinized patterns of behaviour through 
constituting traditions, customs or legal constraints. Cooley (1956:313) underlines a 
dialectical relationship between the constitutive and behavioural functions of 
institutions. To Cooley, institutions are manifested as habits of mind and action, 
largely unconscious because largely common to all groups, rendering the individual 
simultaneously as cause and effect of institutions. 
                                                           
8 See also Commons (1934), Cooley (1956), Giddens (1984:13), Hodgson (1988:134,153), Neale 
(1987:1180, 1994:404), North (1990:3-4,28,61,69), Scott (2001:75,95). 
9 See also Douglas (1982:12), Neale (1987:1184), and Scott (2001:57-58).  
10 See also Bush (1986), Elster (1989), Hayden (1993:309), Hodgson (1988:205), Hughes (1939:297), 
North (1990:4), Parsons (1990:327), Rutherford (1994:182), Scott (2001:34,50-54), Setterfield 
(1993:756,761), Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2), and Tool (1993:132). 
11 See also Durkheim (1950), Mitchell (1950:373), Neale (1994:404), and Veblen (1919:239). 
12 Based on Stinchcombe (1968:107-111). See also Parsons (1940:190) and Scott (2001:55). 
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In a similar vein, Hamilton (1932:84) pointed to a ￿tangled and unbroken web of 
institutions￿ that represents a way of thought (cognitive) or ￿action of some 
prevalence or permanence￿embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a 
people￿ (behavioural). Durkheim (1950) emphasized a cognitive, constitutive, and 
behavioural role for institutions as ￿social facts￿ relayed to the individual through 
systems of knowledge, belief, and moral authority.  As a system of norms, institutions 
￿regulate￿ relations among individuals (Parsons 1934) while as formal and informal 
rules and procedures they structure (constitute) conduct (North 1990:3, Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992). Institutions are diffused through coercive (regulative), normative 
(associative), and mimetic (behavioural) mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Institutions construct actors and constrain as well as empower behaviour (Scott 
2001:34). 
When we speak of something as being ￿instituted￿ and ￿institutionalized￿ we at once 
allude to something that has been adopted by individuals, singly or in groups; 
something by which individuals or groups of individuals may be characterized; and 
perhaps most importantly, something that has reveals a degree of relative permanency 
as manifested in habits, customs, etc. Viewed as such, institutions exist at different 
scales and are discernible at different levels of inter-relations. Scale and level of inter-
relations are explored further in the next section.  
4. Scale and Level of Inter-relations      
The form-, behaviour-, and context-based categories of definitions together with the 
associative, behavioural, cognitive, constitutive, and regulative types of institution 
identified in table 2 are intended to provide a framework for institutional analysis 
sensitive to ￿scale￿ and the level of interaction under study. The categorization and 
grouping of institutions is based on recognition that institutional analysis must be 
sensitive to different scales and levels. Depending on the purpose of the 
institutionalist analysis some scales and levels need to be more, or less, emphasized 
than others since not everything is equally important in all situations and all the time. 
Institutions are context-specific and geographically locatable. Institutions function 
and affect phenomena in the social, economic, political, and ecological domains. 
However, Brenner (1998) asserts that spatial scales can no longer be conceived as 
￿pre-given￿ or ￿natural￿ arenas of social interaction. Spatial scales are ￿at once 
socially constructed and politically contested￿. Scale may be geographical for 
empirical and historical research; organizational for socio-economic and political 
research; strategic for socio-political transformation; discursive in ideological 
struggles for hegemonic control; and constructed through struggles of actors, 
movements, and institutions to influence locational structure, territorial extension, and 
qualitative organization of these scales. Thus, geographical scales are ￿produced, 
contested, and transformed through an immense range of socio-political and 
discursive processes, strategies, and struggles that cannot be derived from any single 
encompassing dynamic￿ (Brenner 1998:460). 
The inherent complexities implied in Brenner￿s articulation of scale are perhaps better 
understood through Jessop￿s (1997) levels of inter-relations and Mann￿s (1996) socio-
spatial levels of social interaction. According to Jessop (1997:102) there are three Economic Activity and Institutions 
SAEED PARTO 
  12
levels of inter-relations. These are: ￿the social embeddedness of interpersonal 
relations￿, ￿the institutional embeddedness of inter-organizational relations￿,  and 
￿societal embeddedness of functionally differentiated institutional orders ￿ in a 
complex, de-centred societal formation￿.
13 For Mann (1996) there are five socio-
spatial levels of social interaction: local (subnational), national, international 
(relations between nationally constituted networks), transnational (networks passing 
through national boundaries), and global (networks covering the globe as a whole).  
These levels of interaction and inter-relations have important implications for 
￿governance￿ of socio-economic spaces which takes place through interrelationships 
involving institutions and organizations at different spatial levels (Jessop 1997). 
Governance is the coordination of interdependent social relations ranging from simple 
dyadic interactions to complex social divisions of labour (Jessop 1999:349). 
Governance may also denote who does what to whom while studies of governance 
(should) focus on the ￿why￿ and the ￿how￿. In power relations terms, governance 
may be defined as the exercise of authority and control by governments, private sector 
interests, and other non-government organizations (Francis 1994) to stabilize or 
destabilize the regime of accumulation. Regardless of which definition one adopts for 
governance, one needs to be able to identify the institutions through which 
governance is exercised. 
5. How to Identify Institutions 
The foregoing synthesis should at least demonstrate that ￿institution￿ or ￿institutions￿ 
are difficult to define. This difficulty is due in part to the diversity of research 
questions requiring a focus on the institutional aspects, context-specificity of the 
problems, and, of course, differences in the disciplinary and political perspectives of 
those conducting the research, addressing the problem, or merely writing on 
institutions. There are some commonalities among the different definitions of 
institutions reviewed above, however.  
There are many examples of institution ranging from the informal, e.g. customs or 
conventions, to formal, e.g., courts, and from intangible, e.g., habits and beliefs, to 
                                                           
13 Jessop (1997:102) describes these terms as follows: 
Social embeddedness: Interpersonal interdependence is associated with an acute problem of trust 
owing to the many-sided ￿double contingencies￿ of social interaction (grounded in the fact that 
ego￿s behaviour depends on expectations about alter￿s conduct and vice versa) where many actors 
are involved; 
Institutional embeddedness: The problem of trust is reinforced on an inter-organizational level 
by the difficulties in securing the internal cohesion and adaptability of individual organizations; 
and in making compatible their respective operational unities and independence with their de facto 
material and social interdependence on other organizations; and 
Societal embeddedness: Inter-systemic heterarchy poses the problem of the material and social 
interdependence of operationally autonomous (or closed) functional systems, each with its own 
autopoietic codes, programmes, institutional logics and interests in self-reproduction. Autopoiesis 
as ￿a condition of radical autonomy secured through self-organization when a system defines its 
own boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own operational code, implements its 
own programmes, reproduces its own elements in a closed circuit and obeys its own laws of 
motion￿. Economic Activity and Institutions 
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tangible, e.g., government, churches, the family. All these examples appear to share a 
tendency to persist over time. These institutions are relatively ￿permanent￿ and 
usually accepted or tolerated by the vast majority of people. The church, state, family, 
language, and so on, though evolving, seem to transmit unchallenged from generation 
to generation with relative ease and little change of the main characteristics. In this 
respect, institutions are analogous to culture. Significant evolutionary change in 
institutions usually occurs outside two or more consecutive generations. Institutions 
have a correlating and patterning effect, bringing order (or consistency) and collective 
purpose into society through establishing a system of norms and beliefs. Institutions 
are also political ￿ they are embedded in habits and are therefore continuously present 
in, or have bearings on, human actions. 
There are different levels of institutions. First, institutions are identifiable in the 
society at large as rules determining individual behaviour. These include laws, beliefs, 
or widely accepted norms. Second, there are organizational norms and rules to be 
followed by the organization￿s members. This is the organization￿s culture, or 
memory according to Nelson and Winter (1982), often expressed as ￿that￿s the way 
we do things around here￿, or ￿that￿s the way we￿ve always done it￿. Third, there are 
rules and conventions to be respected by organizations interacting with one another. 
These constitute the ￿rules of the game￿, to be broken only at the risk of being 
subjected to coercive action or sanctions. Regularities or patterns which occur due to 
force of habit, instinct, or coercion are in effect the rules governing the actions of a 
group of people. In-depth study and analysis of these patterns should reveal the ￿why, 
who, what, when, and how￿ (Neale 1994:402). 
Institutions are inseparable from the geopolitical context of economic activity. To 
most people, the term ￿institution￿ also implies ￿specificities of time and place and 
contrasts with universals (or general characterizations)￿ (Neale 1987:1181). These 
rules are largely responsible for maintaining localized socio-political cohesion and 
stability. Institutions evolve and can be created. Generally, institutions ￿challenge, 
borrow from, and, to varying degrees displace prior institutions￿. There is no question 
that institutions can and do change under certain conditions and over the long-term. 
Institutional change occurs when ￿an existing set of beliefs, norms, and practices 
comes under attack, undergoes deligitimation, or falls into disuse, to be replaced by 
new rules, forms, and scripts￿ (Scott 2001:95). Institutional change is discussed in 
more detail later in this paper. 
Institutions may be regarded as ￿dissipative structures￿. They continuously undergo 
change due to entropy, a tendency toward disorder or disorganization (Zucker 
1988:26). Institutions are created through demand- and supply-side processes and 
come into being because actors devise or borrow new and different rules and models 
to deal with perceived problems requiring new approaches. Institutions are also 
created because certain types of actors ￿occupy institutionalized roles that enable and 
encourage them to devise and promote new schemas, rules, models, routines, and 
artefacts￿ (Scott 2001:109). Economic Activity and Institutions 
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Although not possible to define as wholes, components of institutions, manifested as 
activities of people in situations and in contexts, can be observed and characterized. 
Observation and characterization allow recognition, not definition: ￿one can recognize 
cows and families, but one cannot define either ￿ except operationally: that is, as 
directions for identifying a cow or a family￿ (Neale 1987:1182). There are three 
characteristics that allow institution identification: ￿First, there are a number of people 
doing. Second, there are rules giving the activities repetition, stability, predictable 
order. Third, there are folkviews ￿ most certainly what Walton Hamilton meant by a 
￿bundle of intellectual usages￿ ￿ explaining or justifying the activities and the rules￿
 14 
(Neale 1987:1182). ￿Doing￿ can be seen and thus identified; ￿rules￿ can be identified 
by ￿ordering the doings into repetitive event sequences￿; and the ￿folkviews justify 
the activities or explain why they are going on, how they are related, what is 
important and what is unimportant in the patterns of regularity. Folkviews can be 
discovered by observation, but here the eye is a minor instrument and the ear is a 
major one￿ (Neale 1987:1183). 
Neale￿s approach also allows identifying new institutions. Munkirs (1985) is cited in 
Neale (1987) as having accomplished just this. Based on a quantitative analysis of the 
frequency, circumstances of direct and indirect contacts among officers of major 
corporations, and an analysis of formal and informal planning instruments such as 
stocks, debts, directorships, trusteeships, and transfers and registrars, Munkirs 
establishes that a new economic institution has emerged in the United States. The 
￿centralized private planning￿ coordinates the actions of different companies through 
the flow of information among the corporate officers who are members of the 
informal network (Neale 1987:1190). Identifying institutions in the manner suggested 
by Neale (1987, 1994) provides a large degree of flexibility in the use of the term 
￿institution￿. What is called an institution by an investigator depends on the 
investigator￿s focus of interest, the types of institutional inter-relations under 
investigation, and the scope and level of the hierarchy that emerges from such 
investigation. An institution in one context may not be an institution in another. 
Similarly, the behaviour of an economic agent is time and place specific. 
Conducting institutionalist analysis based on the approach outlined by Neale 
eliminates the need ￿to assume classes of generalized types of activity such as 
economic, religious, or political. These are in fact classifications deriving from our 
own folkviews, which have, of course, been influential in structuring our institutions 
of markets, churches, and governments￿. It is nevertheless useful to have broad 
descriptions of institutions and the roles associated with these descriptions. Some of 
these descriptions and roles are discussed below.  
                                                           
14 ￿Folkviews explain or justify the rules to the people of a society, often explaining and justifying 
simultaneously. Folkviews include values, but equally they include the ideas that people have about the 
universe around them ￿ physical, chemical and biological, as well as social; and the mystical and 
transcendent as well as the worldly￿. [Folkviews] also include all the organizing and directing ideas of 
a culture or subculture￿ (Neale 1994:403) Economic Activity and Institutions 
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6. Role of Institutions 
There is reasonable unanimity among institutionalists as to the role of institutions. 
Institutions ￿play a functional role in providing a basis for decision-making, 
expectation, and belief￿ (Hodgson 1988:205). More broadly, institutions ￿structure￿ 
inter-relations: ￿they enable us to understand what other people are doing and what 
they are likely to do; they enable us to know what we may do and what we may not 
do￿ (Neale 1994:403). Acting as the substance, rather than merely the boundaries, of 
social life (Hodgson 1988:134), institutions ￿reduce uncertainly by providing a 
structure to everyday life. ￿a guide to human interaction, ￿[and] the framework 
within which human interaction takes place￿ (North 1990:3-4). Conversely, 
institutions are ￿social relations that frame the activities of production, consumption, 
and exchange, [acting] as a structure within which individual action in the economy 
takes place￿ (Setterfield 1993:756). Based on an extensive review of the 
institutionalist literature, Scott (2001:48) describes institutions and their role as: 
•  social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience; 
•  composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life; 
•  transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational 
systems, routines, and artifacts; 
•  operating at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized 
interpersonal relationships; and 
•  connoting stability but being subject to change processes, both incremental 
and discontinuous. 
We may deduce from Scott￿s summary that institutions collectively act as an 
integrated web running through different scales of governance and levels of inter-
relations. In addition, institutions are at once persistent, resistant to change while 
capable of changing in evolutionary time and are transmitted through various means 
to consecutive generations thus providing a certain degree of continuity, stability, and 
security. More explicitly, some have suggested ￿long-term institutional changes are 
path dependent, deriving from the specific adjustment path the economy takes toward 
them￿ (Setterfield 1993:761). The path of institutional evolution ￿is shaped by (1) the 
lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the 
organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided 
by those institutions and (2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive 
and react to changes in the opportunity set￿ (North 1990:7). There are different 
approaches for studying the link between institutions and the economic system. Some 
of the approaches making this link are reviewed below. 
7. The “Old Institutionalism” 
The old school of institutionalism is most closely associated with Commons (1961), 
Veblen (1899), and Ayres (1944) who explain ￿institutions by means of historical 
analysis￿by tracing institutions from one period to the next, [accounting] their 
existence￿on the basis of the principle that earlier states account for later ones￿ 
(Setterfield 1993). Veblen￿s approach stressed the ￿cumulative and path-dependent Economic Activity and Institutions 
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nature of institutional change, the role of new technology in bringing about 
institutional change (by changing the underlying, habitual ways of living and 
thinking), and the predominantly ￿pecuniary￿ character of the existing set of American 
institutions￿￿ (Rutherford 2001:174). Veblen was doubtful that the ￿invisible hand￿ 
was applicable to large-scale production, corporate finance, and salesmanship arguing 
for ￿social control￿ of the market so as to ￿make production for profit turn out a larger 
supply of useful goods under conditions more conducive to welfare￿ (Rutherford 
2001:175). 
The old institutionalist methodology is ￿holistic, postulating that the economy cannot 
be understood as a set of separable parts￿that individual phenomena cannot be 
explained without reference to the whole of which they form a part ￿ that the 
characteristics and functioning of the part depend on its relations with other parts, and 
hence its place in the whole￿ (Setterfield 1993:757). The behaviour of the individual 
must thus be seen as ￿function of existing institutions, which form an environment to 
which individuals become socialized over time￿(page 757). Structures (i.e., 
institutions) are emphasized over action (i.e., the choices and activities of individuals) 
in the determination of economic outcomes. The institutional approach is ￿process-
oriented and evolutionary, rather than static and equilibrating￿ (Hodgson 1988:243). 
Because of their interest in processes and whole systems, the old institutionalists were 
able to contribute to debates on psychology and economics, business cycles, the 
pricing behaviour of firms, ownership and control of corporations, monopoly and 
competition, unions and labour markets, various types of market problems and 
failures, public utilities and regulation, and law and economics. The interwar 
institutionalists made important contributions to policy by developing ￿unemployment 
insurance, workmen￿s compensation, Social Security, labor legislation, public utility 
regulation, agricultural price support programs and  [promoting] government 
￿planning￿ to create high and stable levels of output￿ (Rutherford 2001:180-1). The 
Wisconsin School, for example, was able to use the State of Wisconsin as a 
￿laboratory for many innovations that would then be implemented at the national level 
￿ apprenticeship, vocational education, workers￿ compensation, collective bargaining, 
civil service and the administration of labour law￿ (Bromely 1994:390). The early 
institutionalists also exhibited a bias in favour of promoting normative principles 
rather than formulating ￿testable propositions￿ (Scott 2001:6). 
The ￿behaviouralist￿ turn during the 1930s diverted attention away from institutional 
structures to political behaviour, constituted by ￿informal distribution of power, 
attitudes, and political behaviour￿ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:4, cited in Scott 2001:7) 
as manifest in the actions of individuals. This move from institutions to individuals 
was ￿accompanied by a more utilitarian orientation, viewing action as ￿the product of 
calculated self-interest￿ and taking an instrumentalist view of politics, regarding the 
￿allocation of resources as the central concern of political life￿ (March and Olsen 
1984:735) [and viewing politics as the study of] ￿Who Gets What, When, and 
How?￿￿￿ (Scott 2001:7). The reductionism of behaviouralism was ￿reinforced and 
deepened by the ￿rational revolution￿ arising in the 1970s and 1980s￿ (Scott 2001:8). 
The rational choice approach is characterized by ￿an emphasis on rigorous and 
deductive theory and methodology; a bias against normative, prescriptive approaches; Economic Activity and Institutions 
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methodological individualism, or the assumptions that individuals are the only actors 
and that they are motivated by individual utility maximization; and ￿input-ism,￿ a 
focus on societal inputs to the political system ￿ for example, votes, interest group 
pressures, money ￿ to the exclusion of attention to internal workings of the system, or 
the institutional political structures, as they may affect outcomes￿ (Scott 2001:9). 
Drawing on post-Darwinian sciences, institutionalists apply the concept of 
￿cumulative causation￿ to more fully explain the occurrence of socioeconomic 
phenomena (see ￿Role of Institutions￿, above). The institutionalists also borrowed the 
core concept of ￿culture￿ from anthropologists to distinguish ￿the continuities in 
social life from other ranges of causal relations describing human life and behaviour 
at the physical, biological, or psychological levels￿ (Lower 1987:1147-8). There is a 
two-way relationship between human action and institutions: ￿people￿s actions are 
shaped by and reflect culturally inherited but evolving social rules and relationships￿ 
(Neale 1987:1202). This description is consistent Veblen￿s (1899) view of how 
tomorrow￿s institutions are shaped by today￿s institutions through a ￿selective, 
coercive process￿. 
The demise of the ￿old￿ institutional economics has been partly attributed to a failure 
to pay sufficient attention to theoretical development: ￿After establishing the 
importance of institutions, routines and habits, [institutional economists] underlined 
the value of largely descriptive work on the nature and function of politico-economic 
institutions￿ (Hodgson 1988:21-2) at the expense of the further development of the 
theoretical foundations. ￿The revival of institutional economics should not neglect the 
theoretical task, nor fall once again into the empiricist trap￿ (page 23). Institutionalist 
works in economics could be attacked as ￿ad hoc, or as lacking proper foundations in 
a theory of individual behavior￿￿ and for failing to ￿develop ￿theories of social 
norms, technological change, legislative and judicial decision-making, transactions, 
and forms of business enterprise (apart from issues of ownership and control) much 
beyond the stage reached by Veblen and Commons￿ (Rutherford 2001:183). 
8. The “New Institutionalism”  
In recent years, the ￿new￿ institutional economics has been closely associated with 
the works of Coase (1937,1960), Williamson (1985,1994,2000), North (1990), 
Schumpeter (1926) on innovation, Nelson and Winter (1982) on evolutionary theory, 
combined with insights drawn from the Austrian approaches to institutions, e.g., 
Menger (1963,1981) and Hayek (1948,1967). To date new institutionalists seem 
focused on transaction cost analysis of property rights, contracts, and organizations. 
The new institutionalism has been identified as ￿an attempt to extend the range of 
neoclassical theory by explaining the institutional factors traditionally taken as givens, 
such as property rights and governance structures, and, unlike the old institutionalism, 
not as an attempt to replace the standard theory￿ (Rutherford 2001:187). 
The ￿new institutional economics￿ is not a re-emergence of traditional 
institutionalism. The old institutionalism draws inspiration from biology while the 
new institutionalism draws heavily upon physics (Mirowski 1989, cited in Hodgson Economic Activity and Institutions 
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1994d:401). The new institutional economics is a product of ￿developments in the 
heart of modern orthodox [economic] theory itself￿ the ￿new￿ institutionalism rests 
upon some long-established assumptions concerning the human agent￿ (Hodgson 
1994d:397). ￿Institutions and institutional change have generally been analyzed [by 
new institutionalists] as ways of reducing transactions costs, reducing uncertainty, 
internalizing externalities, and producing collective benefits from coordinated or 
cooperative behaviour. ￿[with] a strong tendency to argue that institutions tend 
toward providing ￿efficient￿ solutions to economic problems￿￿ (Rutherford 
2001:187). The new institutionalism in economics shares the classical liberalist 
concept of ￿rational economic man￿, based on the doctrine of ￿methodological 
individualism￿. 
For the new institutionalists, institutions are important only insofar as they relate, as 
an externality, to ￿a model of individual behaviour￿. For most new institutionalists 
￿causality is unidirectional, with institutions arising solely in response to the current 
maximizing behaviour of rational individuals￿. Individuals possess psychologically 
given preference structures and are evaluative utility maximizers ( Hodgson 1994d, 
Setterfield 1993). This line of reasoning overlooks ￿the reverse line of causality￿ 
through which individual behaviour is influenced and constrained by institutions￿ 
(Setterfield 1993:759-60). The influence of institutions is not seen as shaping 
individuals and therefore their actions. This view is in direct contrast to the old 
institutionalist / evolutionary view that individuals are products of a ￿complete and 
cumulative process￿ of change in culture and institutional environments over time. 
This failure is in part attributable to a tendency among the new institutionalists not to 
replace the orthodox economic theory but to develop an ￿economic theory of 
institutions￿ (Langlois 1986). 
New institutional economics ￿is dominated currently by scholars who cling to the 
neoclassical core of the discipline while struggling to broaden its boundaries￿ (Scott 
2001:33). The reliance on the ￿self-organizing￿ properties of the market and the 
￿invisible hand￿ mechanisms to ￿produce social patterns of behaviour without any 
one individual directing the results￿(Setterfield 1993:758) has led the new 
institutionalist to conclude that institutions are products of the spontaneous workings 
in market activity. Many structures and outcomes that constitute the institutional 
landscape are the consequence of unanticipated effects and constrained choice in an 
environment that is simultaneously ￿indeterminate and context-dependent￿. The thrust 
of an institutional theory, according to Scott (2001), should be to ￿account for 
continuity and constraint in social structure ￿[and] not preclude attention to the ways 
in which individual actors take action to create, maintain, and transform institutions￿ 
(Scott 2001:75). 
The sharp contrast between the old and new variants of institutionalism has been 
attributed of the politics of the time and of the individuals commenting on institutions. 
For example, in contrast to the rational individual and the efficacy of the market, 
Hayden boldly states:  
Institutionalism is an ideology. Institutionalists have beliefs: a broad base of 
beliefs about knowledge, philosophy, ceremony, technology, government, and Economic Activity and Institutions 
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political theory ￿ beliefs that are organized in a systematic and congruent 
manner. An ideology is the integration and systemization of congruent beliefs 
(Hayden 1993:304). 
Hayden (1993) describes institutionalism in terms of an ￿approach￿ to science, 
evaluation and policymaking ￿ an approach that arrives at beliefs through scientific 
inquiry. ￿The institutionalist￿s approach to economic policy is (1) values driven, (2) 
process-oriented, (3) instrumental, (4) evolutionary, (5) activist, (6) fact-based, (7) 
technologically focused, (8) holistic, (9) non-dogmatic, and (10) democratic￿ (Petr 
1984, cited in Hayden 1993:304). 
Adopting a sociological and political perspective, Olsen (2000:1) maintains that the 
new institutionalism focuses on ￿political institutions and democratic governance 
[and] how and when international political orders are created, maintained, changed, 
and abandoned￿. This view is echoed by (March and Olsen 1998:26), according to 
whom the new institutionalism ￿represents an attempt to supplement ideas of 
consequential action, exogenous preferences, ￿ and efficient histories with ideas of 
rule and identity-based action, institutional robustness, and inefficient histories￿. The 
central question for the new institutionalists with a socio-political focus ￿where 
structures [or forms] originate and how they are maintained and transformed, 
including the relative importance of deliberate reform and design￿ (Olsen 2000:1). 
History is viewed as ￿inefficient￿, following ￿a meandering path affected by multiple 
equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests and resources (March and 
Olsen 1998:1). Actors are perceived as behaving ￿in accordance with their 
interpretation of rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, 
anticipated, and accepted￿ (Olsen 2000:1). Actors may be driven by ￿habit, emotion, 
coercion, and interpretation of internalized shared rules and principles, as well as 
calculated expected utility driven by incentive structures￿ (Weber 1978, cited in Olsen 
2000:3). 
9. Institutional economics 
The term ￿institutional economics￿ was first coined by Hamilton in 1919 in an 
American Economic Association conference paper (Rutherford 2001:173). The ￿old￿ 
institutionalist tradition in economics has been associated with the works of Veblen 
(1898, 1909, 1919), Commons (1924), Mitchell (1910,1923), and Ayres (1944) who 
emphasized the importance of change and were critical of their colleagues for not 
making its examination central to their mission (Scott 2001:3, also Rutherford 2001 
and Hodgson 1988, 1993). Veblen (1919) drew attention to the importance of 
technological change in the evolution of the economy while Commons (1924) 
￿stressed the centrality of change, viewing the economy as ￿a moving, changing 
process￿￿ (Scott 2001:4). The institutionalist tradition was continued in economics by 
Schumpeter, Polanyi, Galbraith, and Myrdal who underlined the importance of time, 
place, and historical circumstance. 
The differences in philosophical foundation and approach between the old and the 
new strands of institutionalism make the job of defining institutional economics Economic Activity and Institutions 
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difficult. According to some, institutional economics is ￿the study of ￿of how people 
go about provisioning themselves, whether as individuals or as members groups with 
common purposes￿ (Neale 1987:1180). Institutional economics ￿acknowledges the 
existence of a multitude of rules, agreements, customs, and norms ￿[and] studies 
their appearance, their effect on the elementary economic agents and their defects￿ 
(Aglietta 2000:400). Institutional economics is, according to Peterson (1998:165), 
￿the study of the process of social provisioning￿ based on the following axioms: 
•  Inequality and poverty are issues of status and power ￿ they reflect the failure 
of social and economic institutions; 
•  Efficiency and equity are interrelated goals ￿ the emphasis should be placed 
on provisioning and economic security; 
•  All economics is shaped by values and ideology ￿ economics should focus on 
problem solving; 
•  The government and the economy define each other ￿ laissez faire is a myth; 
and 
•  The government plays a critical role in the provisioning process. 
The ideology, defined as ￿the integration and systematization of congruent beliefs￿ 
(Hayden 1994), most associated with institutionalism is ￿communitarianism￿. The 
communitarian approach is based on recognition that people￿s lives and continuing 
welfare needs such as education, income, credit, housing, and health care are 
organized through a social process. Excessive emphasis on individualism leads to the 
fragmentation of the community and ￿alienation, frustration and insufficiency of 
provision of the members￿ needs￿ (Hayden 1994:393). Individualism expressed 
through the institution of the market also seems to nurture ￿invidious￿ (Veblen 1899) 
tendencies, a market-related trait identified long ago by Adam Smith. 
Institutionalist policy analysis requires paying ￿particular attention to developing 
social indicators consistent with the problem, the context and the ideological criteria￿ 
(Hayden 1994:394-5). Social indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, include 
￿consequence indicators designed to measure the results of policies or continuing 
system processes; requirement indicators designed to measure the contributions of the 
required system components; relationship or linkage indicators designed to measure 
the relationships among system components; and monitoring indicators designed to 
provide information on some part of a social process after policy initiative￿ (Hayden 
1994:395). The purpose of social measurement is not to arrive at some ￿grand 
aggregate￿ but to explore different scenarios. Policy and programme development and 
selection is based on ￿designing consequence measures for alternative programmes 
and testing the alternative programmes to determine direct and indirect 
consequences￿. to determine [based on ￿instrumental principle of social value￿
15] 
whether a programme can be expected to improve or exacerbate a problem situation￿. 
(Hayden 1994:396).  
                                                           
15  ￿Institutionalists construe the referential content of ￿instrumental,￿ as originated by John Dewey, to 
allude to a means-consequence interdependent continuum where as the means are chosen, the ends-in-
view are determined, and where ends-in-view become instrumental means to further ends-in-view. 
They reject the dualism-based usage that is reflected in the writings of Milton Friedman and others, in 
which the expression ￿merely instrumental￿ reflects a logical divorcement of means and ends￿ (Tool 
1993:155). Economic Activity and Institutions 
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The government and the economy are inseparable and define each other. Through 
regulating the market place, the government defines and redefines the boundaries of 
economic activity by legitimizing certain power relationships and sanctioning others, 
thus shaping and steering the course of economic development. Non-interference in 
the economy is a tacit indication of government support for the status quo distribution 
of income and power (Samuels 1989, Brown 1988, cited in Peterson 1998). 
Institutional economists should evaluate distributional policies ￿in terms of their 
contribution to the social provisioning process￿, not their ￿intrusiveness into an 
otherwise free market￿ (Peterson 1998:168). Hodgson (1994b) defines institutional 
economics in terms of the rejection of individualistic assumptions of hedonism and 
exogenous preferences in favour of a more organicist conception of individual 
agency; the rejection of an exclusive emphasis on equilibrium in favour of the idea of 
cumulative causation, and the adoption of institutions as the main units of analysis, 
rather than atomistic individuals￿ (Hodgson 1994b:377). Institutional economics 
assumes no universal aim and no universal method or logic. It focuses on ￿the rules 
and opportunities for action and the limits to action, simply assuming that each 
individual is always moved by one or another purpose￿ (Neale 1987:1181) 
That individuals ￿organize themselves for their provisioning￿ is a given in the 
institutionalist approach. The question is ￿how this organization occurs, and whose 
purpose it serves￿. This view of society is the antithesis of the neoclassical view of 
society as the sum of indistinguishable individuals, all with fixed preferences 
functioning rationally, and armed with the same information. ￿Orthodox economics 
￿sees ￿organizing￿ as both unnecessary and undesirable. Markets￿ obviate the need 
for organizing ￿ one simply goes out and maximizes￿ (Bromley 1994:389). 
Institutional economics studies the ￿mediatory￿ functions of institutions as ￿the 
products of behavioural interactions among micro-economic agents￿. It ￿emphasizes a 
variety of relationships [that] create more or less extensive coordination systems 
among micro-economic players, favour certain behaviour patterns, conclude 
agreements and combine individual objectives into collective aims￿ (Aglietta 
2000:400). Institutional economics has thus a ￿strongly evolutionary tendency￿ (page 
400). 
Williamson (2000) distinguishes between institutional micro and macroeconomics. 
The macro level ￿deals with the institutional environment or rules of the game￿ while 
the micro level ￿deals with the institutions of governance￿. Markets, quasi-market, 
and hierarchical modes of contracting (more generally, of managing transactions and 
seeing economic activity through to completion) constitute the institutions of 
governance (Williamson 2000:93). According to North (1994:366), the institutional 
environment is ￿the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interactions￿. There are both formal and informal constraints. Formal 
constraints include constitutions, laws, and property rights while informal constraints 
may be sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. North￿s (1990) 
description of institutions as determining ￿how￿ the game is played while 
organizations represent ￿who￿ is playing the game, seems to capture the macro and 
micro levels, respectively, as described by Williamson (2000). North (1990) further 
views institutions as ￿the constraints that human beings impose on themselves￿. To 
￿internalize￿ the institutional considerations, North suggests ￿building a theory of 
institutions on the foundation of individual choice￿ as a step toward reconciling Economic Activity and Institutions 
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differences between economics and the other social sciences: ￿The choice theoretic 
approach is essential because a logically consistent, potentially testable set of 
hypotheses must be built on a theory of human behaviour. .. our theory must begin 
with the individual￿ (North 1990:5).  
In contrast to the individual-centred approach advocated by North, the Veblenian 
approach may be interpreted as macroeconomics 
￿in precisely the sense that it turns away from the sterilities of price 
equilibrium theories to the realities of the community￿s efforts to feed and 
clothe and house itself. This is what Keynes prevailed upon us to do, pointing 
out that in such an affluent society as ours people go hungry not because of 
any inexorable laws but only because we choose to do as we do in respects 
that are quite amenable to alteration (Ayres 1964:61, cited in Klein 1998:49). 
Hodgson (1988, 1999a) counters ￿the individual￿ with ￿the institutions￿ as a unit of 
analysis because institutions fill a key conceptual gap by connecting ￿the 
microeconomic world of individual action, of habit and choice, with the 
macroeconomic sphere of seemingly detached and impersonal structures￿. Actor-
structure connections signifying mutual interaction and interdependence may thus be 
established (Hodgson 1999a:144). 
The weakness of institutional economics is that it does not deal with ￿the ways in 
which the institutions are linked, dovetailed, hierarchically organized, and so forth, to 
form subsystems￿￿. The institutional approach ￿does shed￿light on the collective 
factors that condition the behaviour of individual economic players and, by extension, 
on the environmental changes produced by the interaction of players trying to loosen 
constraints. But it cannot explain the existence, coherence or incoherence of macro-
economic patterns by this method￿ (Aglietta 2000:401). Some of the definitional 
vagueness and analytical inadequacies of institutional economics may be due to 
mostly explicit recognition of ￿complexity￿, ￿interconnectedness￿, and 
￿interdependence￿ as starting points in the economic analysis. Simplifications need to 
be made of complex phenomena and assumptions need to be made about the relative 
importance of some connections or relations over others so as to make institutional 
analysis feasible. Making simplifications and assumptions may be being resisted 
because it could lead to mimicking the much-criticized neoclassical approach. 
One alleged result of resistance to commit to simplifications and assumptions has 
been a tendency in the old institutionalist tradition to degenerate into na￿ve 
empiricism and historicism, producing ￿largely descriptive work on the nature and 
function of politico-economic institutions￿ (Hodgson 1999a:211) which according to 
Coase (1983:230) was ￿waiting for a theory, or a fire￿. Institutionalists, particularly 
the old variants, seem to adopt a ￿structuralist￿ approach, wherein the role of goal-
oriented individuals in determining economic outcomes and in shaping the 
institutional environment is de-emphasized (Brunner 1987, cited in Setterfield 
1993:757). A second criticism of the old institutionalist approach is the emphasis 
placed on the history of current institutions, ￿as if this, in and of itself, explains [the Economic Activity and Institutions 
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institutions￿] origins and persistence￿ (Setterfield 1993:757), hence understating the 
dynamics and the causes of institutional evolution (page 758). 
The ￿old￿ institutionalist school in economics has been characterized as expressing ￿a 
world view where power, conflict, market failures, and the possibilities of a 
governmental policy are more pronounced than in mainstream economics￿ (Lind 
1993:13). Based on an overview of writings in the old institutionalist tradition, Lind 
(1993) concluded that institutional economists ￿do not use mathematical models and 
￿advanced￿ statistical techniques ￿ [or] any special methods of their own￿, 
recommending that institutionalists should ￿apply a more pluralist methodology, 
where interviews, surveys, and participatory observation are put to a systematic and 
sophisticated use together with the methods of mainstream economics￿ (Lind 
1993:13-14). Underlining the methodological shortcomings of the institutionalist 
approach does not imply that mainstream (neoclassical) economics is 
methodologically more rigorous (Lind 1996). Rather, the implications of these 
shortcomings should be that institutionalists need to employ ￿all types of methods 
from participatory observation to mathematical model building, from experiments to 
statistical analyses of history￿ (Lind 1996:283) to make their arguments more 
convincing. 
10. Evolutionary Economics 
The principle underpinning the neo-classical theory holds that economic subjects are 
rational and that economic relations are ￿modes of coordination between the 
predetermined and unalterable behaviour of these subjects￿ (Aglietta 2000:13). The 
oversight to recognize the interrelated ￿regulatory￿ role of the historical, social, and 
political contexts in the economic process results directly from the overarching 
emphasis on and elaboration of conditions for a ￿general equilibrium￿. Far from 
equilibrium conditions are described as ￿imperfections￿ rather than dialectical 
outcomes of an inherently contradictory, dynamic, and evolving system. Neo-classical 
economics fails to recognize change and instability as the norm, failing further, as a 
consequence, to explain the appearance of stability of ￿things￿ or systems (Harvey 
1996). The goal of the neo-classical theory is ￿to express the essence of its object by 
stripping it of everything contingent: institutions, social interactions, conflicts, are so 
much dross to be purged to rediscover economic behaviour in its pure state [attained] 
in the concept of price, as sufficient and exclusive bond between all rational subjects 
under the uniform constraint of scarcity￿ (Aglietta 2000:14). 
For a number of years now, indeed decades, there has been general dissatisfaction 
with what has come to be known as ￿scientific economics￿. Dissatisfaction concerns 
failure to analyze the economic process in a historical context and to give voice to the 
(evolutionary) social content of economic relations. The crises in contemporary 
western societies compounded by significant socioeconomic and political changes 
during 1990s must propel researchers to pose quite different theoretical questions than 
orthodox economic can muster. The object of economic theory can then become ￿the 
study of the social laws governing the production and distribution of the means of 
existence of human beings organized in social groups￿ (Aglietta 2000:16). The focus 
must be on the transformation of social relations through the creation of new forms, Economic Activity and Institutions 
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e.g. rules, habits, norms, that are ￿both economic and non-economic, that are 
organized in structures and themselves reproduce a determinant structure, the mode of 
production￿ (Aglietta 2000:16). History thus becomes an indispensable component of 
the study, exploring the tension between abstract and concrete.   
Evolutionary economics was in part a reaction against the shortcomings / short-
sightedness of the neoclassical school by some historically grounded and socially 
oriented economists who perhaps sought substance for the ￿science￿ part of 
￿economic science￿. Evolutionary economics developed as an extension of the new 
institutionalism in economics by Nelson and Winter (1982) who drew on the works of 
Veblen on the evolution of the institutions of the economy, Schumpeter￿s ([1926], 
1961) ideas on innovation, and Alchian￿s (1950) view of firms as economic agents 
subject to adaptation and selection processes. Nelson and Winter￿s ￿evolutionary 
theory￿ draws also on biology and the works of Malthus and Darwin to articulate the 
idea of ￿economic natural selection￿ and ￿organizational genetics￿ according to which 
￿traits of organizations, including those traits underlying the ability to produce output 
and make profits, are transmitted through time￿ (Nelson and Winter 1982:9). Nelson 
and Winter make the explicit and practical disclaimer: ￿We are pleased to exploit any 
idea from biology that seems helpful in understanding of economic problems, but we 
are equally prepared to pass over anything that seems awkward, or to modify accepted 
biological theories radically in the interest of getting better economic theory (witness 
our espousal of Lamarchianism)￿(Nelson and Winter 1982:11). 
To understand a given state of the economy, the evolutionary view holds that one 
needs to look back on the processes and the events that preceded that state. The notion 
of evolution also implies that events are irreversible. It was based on this premise that 
Thorstein Veblen resolved to transform economics into ￿an evolutionary science￿ and  
Schumpeter insisted that the ￿essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism 
we are dealing with an evolutionary process ￿ a fact￿.long ago emphasized by Karl 
Marx￿ (Hodgson 1994c:218). The term ￿evolutionary￿ in evolutionary economics 
does not necessarily mean an espousal of gradualism in opposition to ￿revolutionary￿ 
change, a point made clear by Nelson and Winter (1982). Evolution in economics is 
similar to evolution as used by modern evolutionary biologists and involves 
￿discontinuities and revolutionary ￿leaps￿ giving rise to ￿punctuated equilibria￿￿ 
(Hodgson 1994c:219, also Nelson and Winter 1982:10). At the micro, behavioural 
level, instincts, habits, and institutions are viewed as analogous to biological genes 
while ￿the economic life history of the individual is a cumulative process of 
adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the 
agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the last process￿  
(Veblen 1919:74-75, cited in Hodgson 1994c:222). 
An evolutionary approach in economics recognizes ￿irreversible and continuing 
processes in time, as evolution involves irreversible transformations in structure and 
acquisitions of knowledge￿, ￿long-run development rather than short-run marginal 
adjustments, as evolution beholds the grand course of development and not the 
innumerable micro-foundations￿, ￿variation and diversity, as these are the fuel of all 
evolutionary processes of selection￿, ￿non-equilibrium as well as equilibrium 
situations, as evolution applies to open systems which are often far  from Economic Activity and Institutions 
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equilibrium￿, and ￿the possibility of error-making and non-optimizing behaviour, as 
these are part and parcel of both human learning and evolution itself￿ (Hogdson 
1994c:223). Elsewhere, Hodgson (1993:258,1994:66) echoes Nelson and Winter 
(1982) by pointing out that radical change may be a product of gradual change when 
the cumulative strain of gradual change leads to outbreaks of conflict or crisis in a 
stable system, resulting in a radical change in actions and attitudes. On recognition 
that ￿reality is hierarchically ordered￿ and interconnected, Hodgson (1993:266) 
promotes an ￿ad hoc￿ methodology for studying each level of the total system. 
Adopting an ad hoc methodology does away with the concept of social optimum and 
allows for generating insights into what the economic system ￿ought￿ to be doing 
(Nelson and Winter 1982). Experimentation within the economic system ￿ currently 
mostly conducted in a top-down, technocratic fashion and driven by ideology ￿ needs 
to assume an expanded, societal role to generate the information and the feedback 
necessary to guide the evolution of the economic system: 
Hidden-hand theorems disappear, or at least recede to their proper status as 
para-theorems. In their place, however, one can discern the basis for 
arguments in favour of diversity and pluralism. ￿ one begins to get a better 
appreciation not only of why our current economic system is so mixed in 
institutional form, but why it is appropriate that this is so (Nelson and Winter 
1982:402).  
Recognition of interconnectedness within the total system minimizes the possibility of 
making reductionist, arbitrary assumptions. This is because the findings based on 
analysis at one level, when viewed from other perspectives, have to be meaningful 
and relevant to phenomena at ￿lower, higher, or equivalent￿ levels. Being meaningful 
does not imply, however, that context specificity is irrelevant. On the contrary, 
context specificity moulds capitalism while evolving capital relations mould the 
specifics of the context at different scales. ￿Learning￿ is spatial and knowledge 
largely tacit, embedded in social routine, idiosyncratic (Hodgson 1996), and adaptive. 
Even if all knowledge were readily codifiable and communicable, patterns of learning 
and economic development will always be varied and spatially dispersed despite the 
enormous advancements in communication techniques and technologies (Hodgson 
1996). Hodgson￿s (1993) ￿ad hoc￿ methodology and Nelson and Winter￿s (1982) 
evolutionary approach represent two necessary ingredients for studying ￿transitions￿ 
(Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt 2001) in the socio-economy. 
A transition to a new socio-economic state takes place through ￿a set of connected 
changes, which reinforce each other but take place in several different areas, such as 
technology, the economy, institutions, behaviour, culture, ecology and belief systems￿ 
(Rotmans et al. 2001:16). Policy work in ￿real-world situations￿ to effect transition to 
a preferred socio-economic state thus needs to be based on appreciation of place-
specific peculiarities and dangers of importing ￿ideas that have worked well in one 
place and time into another place and time￿ (Sandiford and Rossmiller 1996). The 
institutionalist strand in economics attaches considerable weight to ￿historical 
contingency￿ that underlies the institutional functionality within a particular 
historical, social, political and cultural context (Murrell 1994). An evolutionary Economic Activity and Institutions 
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analysis of economic development provides invaluable illumination for further 
research and policy work if based on recognition of ￿the peculiarities of particular 
places and institutional contexts￿ in relation to the ￿supralocal political context which 
frequently imposes significant constraints upon local institutional trajectories￿ 
(Brenner 2002). Nelson and Winter￿s (1982) vision of ￿diversity and pluralism￿ may 
only be realized through fundamental, radical changes in the economic system, and by 
implication its institutions. Institutional change is explored next. 
11. Institutional Change 
Institutional change ￿shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the 
key to understanding historical change￿ (North 1990:3). To understand processes of 
change, Olsen (2000:4) asks: ￿What is the role of human intention, reflection, and 
choice in the development of political institutions and good government? Under what 
conditions, and through what mechanisms, can political actors rise above, and get 
beyond existing institutional structures?￿ To have new social orders and new 
institutions it may be necessary to ￿recognize that the relationship among political 
action, institutions, and the flow of history involves a complicated interplay among 
several logics of action, institutional roles, and processes of change￿ (page 5). Change 
in institutions often assumes an evolutionary path by remaining ￿within the context of 
existing rules and folkviews, adapting some rules and folkviews and creating some 
new ones￿. Adoption of new rules as a result of coming to contact with different 
cultures may also be a source of institutional change (Neale 1987:1200-1). History, 
tradition, and culture hence determine the extent, nature, and often the direction and 
the feasibility of institutional change. 
The greater the fund of knowledge and its availability, the greater the potential for 
institutional change (Lower 1987). Although innovation occurs in all societies at 
different levels of scientific advancement and/or development, ￿scientifically 
primitive societies do not exhibit rapid rates of ￿progressive￿ institutional change 
￿[because] the time rate of change is constrained by the paucity of the technological 
base from which the innovations must spring￿ (Lower 1987:1105). The inter-
relationships between institutions representing different cultural values can and do 
cause friction in a process that could be likened to ￿strata shifting slowly at different 
rates, but occasionally causing seismic disturbance and discontinuities￿ (Hodgson 
1988: 131). Culture is ￿more than ￿information￿: it is synonymous with the fabric and 
the ensemble of social institutions, [or] ￿ a cumulative sequence of habituation 
[Veblen 1919:241]￿ (Hodgson 1994a:64).  
Institutional change occurs at three levels. At a subsystem (micro) level, established 
institutional arrangements governing behaviour of key organizational actors has been 
observed to be disrupted due to the introduction of new technology, for example 
(Barley 1986, cited in Scott 2001:184). Second, at the organizational form (meso) 
level, changes in practice patterns have been linked to (ideological) changes in core 
values and beliefs at the societal level (Greenwood and Hinings 1993, cited in Scott 
2001:185). Third, at the macro, societal level changes in institutional logics (e.g., 
focus on effectiveness versus efficiency or vice versa) as well as associated changes 
in governance systems, have been found to affect the types and relative numbers of Economic Activity and Institutions 
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certain types of organization (Scott et al. 2000, cited in Scott 2001:186). Change at all 
levels occurs over time as one institutional pattern gives way to a different pattern. 
Ideas (scripts, schemas, and logics) and ordered activities (organizational routines, 
systems, forms) interact to produce structures that over time are reproduced but are 
always subject to change: ￿Institutional structures are medium and outcome: They 
shape and are themselves shaped by subsequent interpretations and activities￿ (Scott 
2001:187).  
Institutional change may be the product of external or internal processes and factors. 
External factors that initiate institutional change include:
16 
•  Introduction of new ￿competence-destroying￿ (versus ￿competence-
enhancing￿) technologies; 
•  Management innovations; 
•  Major changes in political policies, including industrial regulation and 
employment rules; 
•  Major political upheavals, such as wars and revolutions; 
•  Social reform movements, such as civil rights or women￿s liberation; 
•  Economic crisis or dislocations; and 
•  Shifts in cultural beliefs and practices, such as changing conceptions of the 
natural environment. 
Internally, adjustments, refinements, amendments, shortcuts, modifications, and 
departures at the micro (individual) level all take their toll of the contents and 
regulations embedded in the socially constructed institutions at the macro level. 
Conflicting norms and cultural models can occur not only between institutional 
frameworks but also within them (Scott 2001:188-189). For change to be effected, 
legitimation and resources are acquired from key players in existing, societal 
institutional framework (mobilization) to achieve a stable, uncontested, institutional 
settlement (structuration). Favourable change at the macro or micro level may also be 
referred to as process innovation. 
Change can be associated with features of particular institutional components or with 
tensions between components, with the movements of key individuals from one 
institutional setting to another, or it may be a product of ￿coalitions of participants 
with varying interests￿ (Scott 2001:190-1). Institutional change is not a complete 
transformation. It is rather a continuum and a rearrangement exiting patterns or 
recombination of existing factors. Changes in practice co-evolve with changes in 
legitimating logics. Changes in linguistic framing are instrumental in transforming 
marginal, deviant practices into legitimate practice. For example, the conglomerate 
firm, based on ￿the notion of organizations as primordial social units￿, was supported 
from the 1960s through to the 1980s by actions of state, organizational intimidation, 
the advice of business consultants, and the efficiency rationales of organization 
theorists. This notion was discarded in the 1980s in favour of ￿a radical individualist 
view in which corporations were simply ￿financial tinker toys￿ which could be 
arranged at whim, without regard for organizational boundaries￿ (Davis, Kiekmann, 
and Tinsley 1994:549, cited in Scott 2001:191). The emphasis since the early 1990s 
has shifted to organizational models that emphasize ￿core competence￿ and network 
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forms (Scott 2001:191, see for example, Piore and Sabel 1984, Storper 1997, and 
Cooke and Morgan 1998 among numerous others).  
Some commentators are more certain than others about the agency and the magnitude 
of change. For Example, North (1990) holds: ￿The agent of change is the individual 
entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the institutional framework￿. 
The incentives are said to be produced through ￿changing relative prices or 
preferences￿ and lead to ￿overwhelmingly￿ incremental change (North 1990:83-4). 
Regardless of the agency-magnitude of change relationship, informal institutions play 
a major role in modifying, supplementing, or extending formal institutions. The 
stability, or instability, in the economic system is thus the product of the interplay 
between formal and informal institutions. Institutional change over time occurs as a 
result of accidents, learning, and natural selection resulting in the institutionalization 
of new forms, norms, and habits. 
12. Institutionalization 
According to Parsons (1937, 1951), a system of action is said to be institutionalized to 
the extent that actors in an ongoing relation orient their actions to a common set of 
normative standards and value patterns (Scott 2001:15). Berger and Luckmann (1967) 
define institutionalization as a process where systems of symbols (e.g., language) and 
cognition, mediated by social processes, are ￿crucial to the ways in which actions are 
produced, repeated, and come to evoke stable, similar meanings in self and other￿ 
(Scott 2001:17). There are three stages in institutionalization: Externalization, 
Objectification, and Internalization. Externalization is ￿the production, in social 
interaction, of symbolic structures whose meaning comes to be shared by the 
participants￿. Objectification is the process through which this production becomes 
something ￿￿out there￿, as a reality experienced in common with others￿. 
Internalization is ￿the process by which the objectivated world is ￿retrojected into 
consciousness in the course of socialization￿ (Berger and Luckmann 1967, cited in 
Scott 2001:40). 
In studies of institutionalization as a process, the focus should be on the growth (or 
decline) over time of Associative, Behavioural, Cognitive, Constitutive, and 
Regulative elements capable of defining the form and stability to social behaviour.
17 
An in-depth appreciation of these elements can also inform policy-making and 
implementation of policy objectives by highlighting, in ￿real world terms￿, what 
could be expected given the ￿instituted process￿. The intent to change the instituted 
processes and activities needs to be based on the understanding that the new 
process(es) must be structured to fit in other existing processes. This systemic view of 
the institutionalization process, or institutional change, is consistent with articulations 
of ￿cumulative causation￿, ￿path-dependency￿, ￿lock-in￿ (see below), and Neale￿s 
(1987) ￿mutual reinforcement of institutions￿(cited in Hayden 1982a). Hayden 
(1982a: 403-7) draws attention to upper and lower ￿flow deviation￿ bands, to denote 
the upper and lower boundaries beyond which the projected change in existing 
process(es) is at best difficult to effect. Fundamental, structural change, such that the 
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mode of production or materials flow in the economy is reconstituted requires 
persistent external pressures to mould the new ￿instituted process￿, likely to be a 
product of old and new institutions. 
Holm (1995) distinguishes between two nested types of processes: practical versus 
political actions. Practical actions are taken within a given framework of 
understanding, norms, and rules, serving to reproduce the institutional structure or, at 
most, stimulate incremental changes. Political actions are taken with the purpose of 
changing the rules or frameworks governing actions (cited in Scott 2001:197). 
Structures (institutional forms and arrangements) are ￿historical accretions of past 
practices and understandings that set conditions on action￿ (Barley and Tolbert 
1997:99, cited in Scott 2001:200). Structures exist prior to an action, or indeed may 
give rise to an action, but are also affected by that action. Politically, economic and 
social conditions as well as the design of institutions determine how well or badly the 
political system serves its citizens. 
Government agencies and legal courts are ￿arenas for contending social forces [as 
well as] collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and 
defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs￿ (March and Olsen 1989:17). 
The coherence of institutions￿ collective behaviour varies but is ￿sometimes 
substantial enough to justify viewing a collectivity as acting coherently￿ (March and 
Olsen 1989:18). This view of institutional inter-relations resonates with the concept of 
￿institutional thickness￿ (Amin and Thrift 1994), or ￿filieres￿ (Amin 1999, Cooke and 
Morgan 1998, Amin and Thomas 1996). Institutions define the framework within which 
￿politics takes place￿ (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, 1995). Political institutions 
coerce, manage exchange through incentives, redistribute, build political culture, and 
develop structures for the sustenance of civic virtue and democratic politics (March 
and Olsen 1995). These activities occur within an environment best described as the 
system of ￿governance￿. Governance may be defined as ￿strategic and goal-oriented 
activity￿. Such activities may be regulatory and contribute to the stabilization of 
economic growth by instituting a stable regime of accumulation, or they may be anti-
regulatory (Goodwin and Painter 1997:26) and undermine the (currently stable) 
regime of accumulation.  
If governance were defined as ￿the exercise of authority and control by governments, 
private sector interests, and other non-governmental organizations￿ (Francis 1994), 
then one could conclude that governance as a system has existed since the inception 
of first human settlements and their institutions. Governance is exercised through 
formal and informal institutions that define inter-relations among individuals, or 
political actors, in different group settings. In western democracies, governance ￿is 
about the structured ways and means in which the divergent preferences of inter-
dependent actors are translated into policy choices to allocate values, so that the 
pluarity of interests is transformed into co-ordinated action and the compliance of 
actors is achieved (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999: 5). Governance is the product of 
overlapping and often counterposing tendencies generated by social, economic, and 
ecological systems. Thus, numerous inter-related tendencies and factors ￿regulate￿ the 
actions of political actors, and thus, the regime of accumulation at different scales. Economic Activity and Institutions 
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Political actors ￿are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their 
expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political 
institutions￿ (Olsen 2000:2). The society is seen as ￿a configuration of institutions, 
norms, rules, and practices￿ and ￿a community of rule followers with distinctive 
sociocultural ties, cultural connections, intersubjective understandings based on 
shared codes of meaning and ways of reasoning, and senses of belonging￿. The 
society is where ￿identities and rules are constitutive as well as regulative and are 
[moulded] by social interaction and experience￿ (Olsen 2000:1-3). Social order is 
brought about through ￿legitimate institutions, principles, procedures, methods, rights, 
and obligations [which] restrict the possibilities of a one-sided pursuit of self-interest 
or drives￿ (Weber 1978, cited in Olsen 2000:1). Institutional analysis cannot view 
institutions ￿solely as incentives and opportunity structures that regulate behaviour by 
affecting calculations and transaction cost￿. Institutions must be viewed as what 
constitutes ￿political actors￿ (Olsen 2000:3). The next section explores some of the 
implications of Olsen￿s and others￿ approach to institutional analysis. 
13. Institutional analysis 
Institutional analysis may be conducted in two ways: ￿one that breaks down the total 
social structure into components that we call institutions; and another that builds up 
larger components (again, the institutions) from smaller components (situations). ￿ 
One can analyze (predict) actions, or the limits of actions, only by understanding how 
the people in a culture organize and differentiate their institutions, or (the same thing) 
how they allot situations to different institutions. ￿We ￿ operationally identify an 
institution by the common rules governing sets of activities (activities in ￿like￿ 
situations) and by the explanations given for the rules￿￿ (Neale 1987:1185). 
Institutional analysis ￿concentrates upon explaining how the institutions within each 
specific society are related to each other. The relationships among institutions are 
functional in that each takes over where ￿the writ of rules￿ of another ￿ceases to run￿ ￿ 
the functions of any one institution are to provide the rules and folkviews governing 
activities that are not governed by the rules and folkviews of another institution￿ 
(Neale 1987:1195). 
Institutional analysis ￿does not deny the importance of the motives of individuals, but 
in an institutional analysis one does not try to guess at the motives￿ (Neale 1994:405). 
In this respect institutional analysis is similar to the regulationist approach in that the 
focus is firmly on understanding processes and events. For some, institutional analysis 
represents the means through which economics could be transformed into a ￿policy 
science, and by implication, a normative science￿ (Neale 1994:406). Similarly, 
Hayden (1993) suggests, ￿the history of institutionalist thought is a history of concern 
for policy, both with reference to the influence of policy on the sociotechnical system 
and to instrumental evaluation to determine good policy￿ (Hayden 1993:283). 
Institutional analysis should occupy a more central place in the realm of policy 
making since ￿policymaking continues to cry out for ￿an integrated transdisciplinary 
approach to the social and policy sciences￿ (Hayden 1993:284). 
Policy science does not pay sufficient attention to policy making. Technology, 
defined as ￿the combination of tools, skills, and knowledge ￿ organized as the Economic Activity and Institutions 
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industrial arts of a society￿.[whose] change stimulates creation of new social 
relationships and thus a new society￿, is the most emphasized aspect of policy making 
in the institutionalist literature (Hayden 1993:291). Polanyi (1957) placed great 
emphasis on the links between policy and technology and how policy, not process, 
determines alternative technology and alternative ways of instituting technology. 
Research is a powerful weapon ￿in the determination of the kind and structure of 
technology that will be instituted and of the enhancing or deteriorating uses to which 
it will be put￿ (Hayden 1993:292). A significant part of the task is to determine the 
desirability of the technology in question, the institutionalization process required to 
adopt the technology, and whether or not expectations of adoption and the subsequent 
change are realistic ￿ given the institutional context. 
Collectively, Foster (1981) and Swaney (1987) have developed a set of criteria for 
technological assessment. For new technology Foster offers ￿technological 
determinum, recognized interdependence, and minimal dislocation￿. To these criteria 
Swaney adds ￿the criterion of coevolutionary sustainability which means that 
development paths or applications of knowledge that pose serious threats to continued 
compatibility of sociosystem and ecosystem evolution should be avoided￿ (Hayden 
1993:294). Knowledge is not ￿out there￿ to be discovered ￿ it is created. Findings by 
researchers and scientists are determined by the frame chosen by the investigator. As 
individuals, researchers always carry with them a considerable moral / ideological 
baggage which affects much of scientific work. It follows that the frame of reference 
for economists is not given, but created by them (Hayden 1993:294). If in economic 
analysis the assumption is one of supremacy of the market and market models are the 
frames of reference, ￿the findings￿ are usually irrelevant to policymaking￿ (Hayden 
1993:295). Recognizing this, some institutional economists in the Veblian tradition 
have adopted the ￿theory of instrumental value￿ as their conceptual framework.  
14. Theory of Instrumental Value 
Instrumental value principle underlies the (old) institutionalist approach
18 and holds: 
￿Do or choose that which provides for the continuity of human life and the 
noninvidious recreation of community through the instrumental use of knowledge￿ 
(Tool 1993:121). There are four primary conceptual components: 
The continuity of human life: ￿implies that a balanced diet for the 
malnourished people should come before luxury automobiles; that one 
human￿s right to live should come before another￿s right to bear arms; and that 
the human community must live within its ecological means￿ (Swaney 
1987:1740, cited in Tool 1993:121). 
The Re-creation of community: ￿People are, quite naturally, social animals￿.  
When these existing prescriptive [institutional] arrangements are perceived as 
failing to provide adequately for the flow and quality of real income, given the 
level of understanding evident, the community has a problem. The character 
and the continuity of the community is threatened. ￿The continuing task is 
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the re-creation of community through institutional adjustment￿.Institutions, 
or elements thereof, that have become significantly ceremonial and inefficient 
in their operation, are candidates for modification or abandonment￿ (Tool 
1993:122). 
Pursuit of noninvidious change: Tool (1993) interprets Veblen￿s ￿invidious￿ 
as ￿judgements of worth or merit rooted in race, creed, gender, ancestry, 
ethnicity, wealth, ownership, power, tradition, and the like. ￿Such 
[judgements] generate class, status, rank, income, discretion, and participatory 
distinctions within communities. These groups and individuals against whom 
invidious discrimination is directed are denied options, entitlements, and the 
full development of their capabilities (page 122). 
The instrumental use of knowledge: means ￿appropriate and effectual recourse 
to evidentially grounded and logically coherent products of prior inquiry￿ 
(Tool 1993:123). In effect, this recourse involves ￿taking stock￿ of what there 
is and establishing ￿benchmarks￿ for what could be achieved to ensure the 
￿continuity of human life￿. 
The contrast between these components and a sizable bulk of the literature concerning 
technology and the ￿new￿ economy appears to be the ￿communitarian￿ focus of the 
former and the (largely) market-based reasoning of the latter. The inquiry function of 
the ￿theory of instrumental value￿ (and of its four primary conceptual components) is 
to provide ￿criteria with which an investigator can approach social and economic 
analysis￿. The theoretical function is to suggest ￿how problems may be identified, 
what sorts of evidence to seek, how to arrange it for analysis, how to identify and 
track causal determinants of problems, and perhaps, what sorts of institutional 
adjustments could constitute solutions￿ (Tool 1993:124). 
The instrumental value principle is ￿an evolutionary construct addressed to an 
understanding and appraisal of cumulative causation￿. ￿￿ends are causal and 
provisional outcomes￿people [are] discretionary agents, as conditioned by and 
conditioners of culture, and as appliers of value theory￿ (Tool 1993:125). 
Instrumental valuation is ￿concerned with the intellectual selection of future 
alternative actions￿ (Street 1987:1861). Tool￿s variant of the institutionalist approach 
(the instrumental value principle) shares the regulationists￿ ￿non-prescriptive￿ 
approach in that it ￿incorporates no recommended institutional structure, it provides 
criteria for choosing among alternative structures￿.it does not recommend or imply, 
for example, a particular pattern of ownership, of governance, of market exchange, or 
of productive associations￿ it is a product of human inquiry, it reflects and draws its 
significance from the problem solving experience of a community￿. This approach 
has much in common with ￿scenario planning / building￿, utilized in business 
organizations since the late 1960s and aimed at managing the uncertain environment 
in which businesses operate. World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 




19 In scenario planning, possible futures are explored and 
decisions are made on how to accommodate and take advantage of potential 
outcomes. Because of the emphasis on strategic thinking, there is an immediate fit for 
experimentation as a necessary component of exploring potential future trajectories. 
We can further ask why some structures or practices are adopted by some 
organizations but not by others in similar situations. There are differences over space 
and time in the strength of cognitive beliefs or normative controls. The increasing 
prevalence of a form or practice is an indicator of increasing legitimation. Early 
adoption has a direct relationship with the size of the organization. Larger 
organizations often tend to be resource rich, differentiated thus more sensitive to 
changes in operating environment, and more visible to the public and government 
(Scott 2001:165). At the organizational level, personal qualities and formal education 
of leading individuals are said to affect adoptive behaviour (page 166). Linkages and 
networks among organizations (cohesion) may facilitate or curtail adoption of new 
structures of practices. Organizations are prone to imitate the behaviour of 
organizations that are geographically proximate; that are perceived to be similar (of 
the same industry, for example); that are closely connected by ties, including 
resource, information and board interlocks; that have high status or prestige; and that 
are more visibly successful. In addition, in the pecuniary tradition, ￿firms may select 
less successful others as a comparison set to justify or place their own actions in a 
favourable light￿ (Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999, cited in Scott 2001:168). Other 
factors affecting the adoption of new practices include path dependency, cumulative 
causation, lock-in, and scale. These are discussed below. 
15. Path dependency, Cumulative Causation, Lock-in, and Scale  
￿Both lock-in and path dependence appear much more complicated in the case of 
institutions than in the case of technology￿ (North 1990:103). ￿Path dependency￿ may 
be described as ￿dependence on initial conditions￿ (after Arthur 1990), or a recurring 
emergence of initial conditions, resulting in relative permanency (Hodgson 1988; 
1993, 1999a) of particular habits / customs and institutional forms. Path dependency 
￿is another way of saying that history matters￿ (North 1990:365, cited in Williamson 
2000:104). Path dependency is said to be a chronic source of inefficiency in 
economics and politics (Williamson 2000:104). ￿Cumulative causation￿ is closely 
associated with the better-known economic concept, the ￿multiplier effect￿. 
Cumulative causation is thus defined as the unfolding of events connected with a 
change in the economy (Myrdal 1957) due to the appearance of a new enterprise 
which may be private, e.g., a factory, or public, e.g., a government institution or a 
public-private partnership. ￿Lock-in￿ and its relationship with path dependency and 
cumulative causation is best demonstrated in an example from Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1995):  
The archetypal case of path dependence has been, of course, the configuration 
of the typewriter keyboard. ￿the standard "QWERTY" keyboard arrangement 
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is dramatically inferior to an arrangement offered by August Dvorak, but we 
are locked into the inferior arrangement by a coordination failure: No one 
trains on the Dvorak keyboard because Dvorak machines are hard to find, and 
Dvorak machines are hard to find because no one trains on Dvorak keyboards. 
The process is said to be path dependent in that the timing of the adoption of 
QWERTY, and not its efficiency, explains its survival (Liebowtiz and 
Margolis 1995:210).   
Recent institutional research concerning ideas and interests, normative frameworks 
and power processes, and rule systems and strategic action view power as vested in 
institutions but also allow for conflicting logics and interests to give rise to challenges 
leading to institutional change. A common feature of all recent studies of institutional 
processes ￿ building, extending, maintaining, revising, and dismantling ￿ is that the 
analysts consider multiple scales ￿ individuals, organizations, fields, nation-states, 
international associations ￿ in tracing the interweaving of action, processes, and 
structures (Scott 2001:195-6).  
16. Technological Regime Shifts and Innovation  
Institutional analysis could begin by asking such basic questions as how institutions 
arise and achieve stability, legitimacy, and adherents; how institutions are created; 
how institutions (including technology) are maintained and diffused; or how 
institutions lose credibility and undergo change. Actions by individuals and 
organizations today are different than actions by individuals and organizations 100, 
50, or even 10 years ago. For example, new firms at the time of founding or new 
industrial practices at their inception are systematically assessed for their 
environmental impact because of the changed institutional (regulative, cognitive-
cultural, and normative) environment and the related ￿imprinting￿ (Stinchcombe 
1965, Scott 2001) processes associated with it. Similarly, individuals today operate 
according to a different set of rules governing social behaviour. 
According to Hargadon and Douglas (2001), innovations are accepted and adopted 
when they are embedded in legitimate as well as familiar designs. Embedding 
innovations increases the possibility of winning against established institutions and 
subsequent adoption. Changes in prevailing norms and forms go through ￿a critical 
stage of theorization [to articulate the problem and possible solutions] and 
legitimization [adoption of new norms and practices] by existing or new actors￿ 
(Dacin et al. 2002:48). Legitimation of change may be accomplished through ￿some 
form of conformity to field-level cognitive interpretations (Glynn and Abzug 2002), 
market feedback (Lee and Pennings 2002), or the development of constitutive rules 
that provide guidelines for change (Hinings and Davis-Blake 2002)￿ (Dacin et al. 
2002). These views are consistent with Hayden￿s (1982a) upper and lower ￿flow 
deviation￿ bands (see ￿Institutionalization￿, above) which denote the ￿acceptable￿ 
limits of proposed change.  Economic Activity and Institutions 
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According to March and Olsen (1999:307), ￿institutions link states (and their 
components) in structures of shared norms and expectations that impinge on nation-
state autonomy and make it hard to maintain sharp distinctions between foreign and 
domestic politics￿. By institution, March and Olsen mean ￿relatively stable collection 
of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in 
specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning 
and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the 
practices and rules associated with them. Practices and rules are also embedded in 
resources and the principles of their allocation that make it possible for individuals to 
enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and 
sanction those who wander from proper behavior￿ (page 308) 
17. Conclusion 
What constitutes an institution is not universal or generalizable and depends largely 
on the researcher, the subject of research, and the research question. Because of this 
conceptual looseness, inevitable difficulties (and many opportunities) are associated 
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